INTRODUCTION
The global economic crisis that crystallised in September 2008 sent reverberations throughout the world. The magnitude of this 'economic state of emergency' was dramatically described by UK Prime Minister David Cameron as the 'economic equivalent of war'. 2 Conceptualising an economic crisis as tantamount to war or a state of emergency is not, however, a 21 st Century development. Since the early decades of the 20 th Century, and even before that, 3 political rhetoric compared economic crises to military threats and therefore perceived or represented by government rhetoric as necessitating an emergency response. 4 This article presents a legal, as opposed to political or economic, perspective on these 'emergency' responses to economic crises. The aim of this article is not to question the economic merits or efficacy of these economic measures, but to challenge from a legal constitutionalist perspective the validity of arguments pertaining to the manner in which such emergency measures are enacted. Specifically, can equivalence be drawn between economic crises and national security crises? Focus therefore is on the processes surrounding the introduction of these economic measures rather than the substantive content of the measures themselves.
In particular, this article questions whether the suppositions that underpin the standard national security emergency response of legislative (as distinct from judicial) deference to the executive in times of emergency can be assumed for economic crises. Part I introduces this concept of emergency government in a period of crisis, emphasising the consolidation of power in the executive when confronting a threat to national security. Fundamental aspects 2 of the emergency paradigm -temporariness, necessity, and expedience -are introduced; and the classic defence of this 'executive supremacy' is then explained as due to the speed at which the executive is able to react to a crisis, and the expertise the executive possess in issues of national security making them best placed to decide what response is necessary.
Part II presents an illustrative discussion of economic crises being subject to emergency responses similar to crises to national security. Historical examples from the 20th Century will be sketched before providing more recent instances from the 2008 economic crisis.
Ireland's response to its acute economic crisis in particular shall be proffered as an example of an emergency response and how there is a close correlation between the manner in which states have responded to economic and national security crises.
Part III then challenges this legislative deference to the executive in a period of economic emergency. This shall be done firstly by questioning the concept of executive expertise on economic issues, and secondly by challenging the 'necessity' of such economic measures.
This article concludes by contending instead that arguments of necessity in an economic crisis are arguments about expedient government and law-making. However, as the issue of speed is not one unique to economic crises but is endemic throughout the regulation of the everyday capitalist world, it cannot amount to a normative argument for departing from the status quo. If such arguments are acceded to in the name of speed alone then the result will be a permanent change to the legal system rather than an exceptional measure in a period of crisis. Furthermore, many responses to economic crises do not envisage a return to the status quo that existed before the economic state of emergency as aspects of this prior status quo were responsible for the crisis. Economic states of emergency thus usher in a 'new normalcy'. While this key justification of the emergency paradigm -that such exceptional measures are temporary -is one that is being increasingly challenged in the wider literature on emergency powers today, this article contends that the temporariness of emergency powers is a particularly problematic assumption when applied to economic states of emergency.
STATES OF EMERGENCY: EXECUTIVE SUPREMACY
Emergency is a term used in legal norms, political rhetoric, and lay understanding to cover a multitude of different crises and phenomena of varying magnitudes. In a generalist sense, states of emergency are declared by governments or emergency services in order to facilitate 3 an expedited response of an exceptional nature to a perceived threat or crisis. Legal sources giving effect to this 'emergency paradigm' recognise this element of urgency with the ordinary controls on state power relinquished to enable a swift response to the crisis at hand once a state of emergency is declared. Analogously, a de jure state of emergency may not be declared but the state or its actors may respond to a crisis in a manner similar to that in which they would have reacted had an emergency been declared. 5 These de facto emergencies mirror closely, both in the response taken and particularly in the political rhetoric justifying their introduction, the assumptions that underpin an official declaration of an emergency. 6 Consequently, the fact that a state has not declared a state of emergency is not conclusive that it is not utilising an 'emergency paradigm'. The phenomena that trigger such emergency responses vary widely: from war and terrorist attacks, to natural disasters, and, as this article contends, economic crises; nevertheless, it is the case that the majority of academic scrutiny operates on instances pertaining to national security specifically. 7 In particular, numerous writers have drawn attention to the proper functioning of the separation of powers in such emergencies and the resultant executive supremacy that occurs as a response to these national security crises. 8 Regardless of the phenomenon that triggers it, an emergency response should be one not permissible during 'normalcy' as it is the constraints on power that ordinarily exist that requires the de jure declaration of an emergency. Once an emergency is declared, the relevant state actors are liberated from these constraints and free to act accordingly. Often, however, the constraints that are relaxed or abandoned imbue the political, legal, and constituent 4 identity of a state; i.e. in a liberal-democratic state with respect for the rule of law and human rights it is these very ideals that may be slackened or derogated from altogether. The unpalatable nature of emergency powers is tempered by their assumed temporariness: once the threat is defeated so too will the exceptional measures disappear. 9 The emergency paradigm is thus based upon the assumption that one can separate emergency from 'normalcy;' with exceptional crises and responses to such crises falling into the former category, quarantined from the ordinary phenomena and powers that define the status quo.
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Emergency is the outlier to this normalcy and once the threat is defeated, so too will the exceptional emergency powers be relinquished.
This assumption of a separation between normalcy and emergency is one that is increasingly challenged in the literature, however. 5 additionally represented as justified on the consequentialist grounds that they are necessary to respond to the threat at hand.
Necessity: the justification for exceptionality
In national security emergencies, the sacrifice of constitutionalist principles such as human rights, the rule of law, and ordinary democratic procedures are represented as being unpalatable but unavoidable decisions that need to be taken in order to respond to a threat at hand. 14 However, while such measures are unpalatable, they are nevertheless represented as preferable to a failure not to act and not confront the emergency. In essence, emergency situations present an example of a duress of circumstances that requires a decision-maker to choose between comparably unpalatable courses of action.
This idea of a constraint of choices in a period of emergency is reflective of the concept of necessity in both philosophy and the criminal law. The classic thought experiment of necessity in philosophy is that of the run-away trolley, where the subject is asked whether it is morally right for a person to change the direction of a railway trolley in order to save five innocent people by directing it into the path of one innocent person thus killing them instead. 15 The subject in the trolley problem could possibly avail of the criminal law the defence of necessity which potentially arises where:
the defendant could have complied with the letter of the law, but decided not to do so because he thought that such compliance would in all probability result in a harm or evil as great or 
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With necessity, often the idea of a choice may be constrained to such an extent that it is merely notional, with the actor asserting that they 'had no choice' but to pursue the course of action they had taken. 17 Nevertheless, there is still always a choice, although it may be one between two comparable evils with the choice being the 'lesser of two evils'.
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The use of torture and the attempts by some states' criminal justice systems to excuse or justify such behaviour, notwithstanding the jus cogens status of the prohibition of torture in international law, illustrates how criminal law and national security concepts of necessity can overlap. In Public Committee against Torture in Israel v Israel the Israel Supreme Court held that a person prosecuted for using torture may be able to rely on the defence of necessity. 19 A similar sentiment was echoed by US officials tasked with issuing advice to CIA interrogators regarding their liability for so-called 'enhanced interrogation techniques' by relying on §3.02
(1)(a) of the US Model Penal Code which states that:
Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and (b)
neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defences dealing with the specific situation involved; and (c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear. 20 Attempts to justify exceptional and illegal measures such as torture therefore rely on the claim that they are necessary, using consequentialist or utilitarian forms of ethical reasoning. The law is made for the state not the state for the law. If the circumstances are such that a choice must be made between the two, it is the law which must be sacrificed to the state.
Salus Populi suprema lex esto.
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National security states of emergency reflect the concept of necessity with decision-makers justifying their choices on the grounds that such action, despite its unpalatable or even illegal nature must nevertheless be taken in order to alleviate a greater harm that would occur were the status quo maintained. This representation of necessity must not be taken at face value, however. Giorgio Agamben stresses the naivety of theories that assume necessity is an objective fact. 26 Agamben instead asserts that the concept of necessity is 'an entirely subjective one, relative to the aim that one wants to achieve.' 27 The language of emergency is a powerful and emotive force that can shape the legal discourse around the necessity of such The subjective nature of the labelling of a crisis as warranting an emergency response must be taken into account; however, this too should not be over-stated. What gives necessity an objective component is that the aim to be achieved by undertaking the measure is one that anyone would agree ought to be achieved if they found themselves in a given situation.
Agamben's critique of necessity should not result in an abandonment of the concept of necessity in general but instead it should focus a more critical scrutiny upon the decisionmaker who invokes the rhetoric of emergency in the first instance. Invariably, in crises of national security it is the executive that is this initial decision maker. The executive therefore acts while the legislature and courts defer.
The emergency paradigm and executive dominance
A quintessential aspect of the emergency paradigm is that it is the executive that acts in a period of extreme crisis. Emergency situations amplify a tension at the heart of the separation powers theory: the prevention of a consolidation of power in one branch of government and potential abuse that could arise from this; and the facilitation of a state structure that is appropriately able to exercise its powers in a timely and efficient manner. 31 10 this article is concerned with legislative -as distinct from judicial -deference to the executive during economic crises, Kavanagh's definition is nevertheless useful as it presents an accurate synopsis of the relevant justifications for deference: that the branch one is deferring to has superior expertise, institutional competence, or legitimacy than the branch that is deferring.
National security is a field in which the institutional competence and expertise of the judiciary is represented as being weak. 38 Furthermore, the lack of democratic legitimacy weighs heavily on the judiciary when assessing national security implications, again resulting in the deference to the political branches. Democratic legitimacy cannot, however, displace legislative oversight of executive decisions on national security issues. On the contrary, the trend is that such legislative affirmation is becoming more important to legitimise executive action. Thus while the UK government may undertake military action without legislative approval, it has been suggested by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown that it is highly unlikely that it would ever do so in future. 39 That the executive has less democratic legitimacy than the legislature is seen by the lesser hesitancy judiciaries have in invalidating executive orders that are deemed to infringe on human rights than legislation that similarly infringes, even in jurisdictions where the judiciary have the power to strike down laws as unconstitutional.
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Notwithstanding the legislature's superior democratic legitimacy, the executive is nevertheless considered to be best placed to take decisions on national security, particularly in a time of crises. The executive is the branch most capable of taking expedient decisions due to a lack of formalist decision-making procedures that can slow down such processes in the legislature and particularly in the courts. The executive may also be privy to sensitive or 12 intertwined, interdependent, and therefore feel the effects of fluctuations in each other. Under this 'compression theory' the globalised world is a much smaller place where economic interactions happen at an ever increasing pace. 46 Furthermore, a globalised economy requires a similarly globalised regulatory framework, beyond national parliaments and capable of responding in an expedient fashion. Expedient decision-making thus appears to be endemic to economic decision-making, even in normalcy. However, when economic decision-making is conceptualised as being undertaken in a period of emergency (whether de facto or de jure), the necessity of expedience is arguably compounded further. It is to these 'economic states of emergency' that this article now turns to.
THE ECONOMIC STATE OF EMERGENCY
The early years of the 21st Century have been dominated by two distinct international 
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Responses are therefore not just fire-fighting but also preventative and future-oriented in order to prevent such mismanagement from occurring again. A return to the status quo or 'normalcy' that existed prior to the crisis is therefore not desirable as this 'normalcy' is itself represented as being part of the problem. This is true too of the manner in which states respond to terrorist threats, no longer merely reacting but also seeking to prevent future attacks from happening by 'defending further up the field.' 66 Thus 'normalcy' in the sense of the status quo that existed before the crisis -be it economic or terroristic in nature -will not be restored, nor, as this rhetoric represents, should it. Former US Vice-President Dick Cheney succinctly describes this post 9/11 world of perpetual terrorist and perpetual counter-terrorist prevention measures as the 'new normalcy' and the same is applicable for the post Euro-crisis EU. 67 The financial crisis therefore has not been so much an emergency for the EU warranting temporary fire-fighting responses. Instead it was more akin to a 'constitutional moment' or, at the very least, a constitutional challenge requiring fundamental institutional reforms. 68 It is, in essence, a catalyst for a 'new normalcy' in the Eurozone area.
The 2008 Financial Crisis: The Irish Experience
Prior to, and in addition to the FCT, many EU member states had to introduce domestic measures to combat the financial crises they were facing. Ireland's response to its acute economic crisis provides an illustrative example of deference to and conferral of power on the executive in such perceived exceptional economic circumstances. States utilised exceptional measures that would not have been contemplated in ordinary circumstances, and did so in an expedient fashion. Despite these similarities between responses to economic crises and national security emergencies, however; the assumptions that underpin these responses -their necessity and the requirement of an expedient response -warrant a closer analysis and further stress-testing.
QUESTIONING DEFERENCE IN AN ECONOMIC CRISIS
Constructing a typology of emergency powers based on the phenomena that trigger them may be of limited use for critical academic inquiry. Such a typology could be counter-productive due to the evolving nature of crises and the additional problems or unrest that may erupt after the initial triggering event. A war, for example, could have economic consequences; and vice versa. However, it is also possible that the phenomenon that triggers the emergency response -whether de facto or de jure -warrants its own unique response. Responses to a national security crisis will be fundamentally different from those in a period of economic crisis; however, as discussed above, the procedures through which such measures are introducedthrough executive supremacy -are strikingly similar. The use of political rhetoric to equate economic crises to war further corroborates the need to inquire into this equivalence that is drawn and whether the assumptions that underlie legislative deference to the executive in a national security emergency -the greater expertise of the executive and the necessity issue - 20 also arise in a period of economic crisis. On a wider note, the capacity of economic states of emergency to be conceptualised as exceptional aberrations from the status quo capable of being quarantined from 'normalcy' also requires greater scrutiny.
The expertise of the executive on economic issues?
As stated previously, legislative and judicial deference to the executive on matters of national security is justified by the ability of the executive to decide in an expedient manner and the perceived expertise the executive has to make such decisions. Like in crises pertaining to national security, the judiciary is often considered an inappropriate branch to decide upon issues of economic policy due to the lack of expertise they have in making decisions pertaining to macro-economic policy and the legitimacy of such electorally salient issues dependent upon democratically responsible decision-makers. 
Economic crises and information
To recap, in national security crises, classified information that the executive is privy to acts television, 24 hour news channels, and most recently the internet. Access to real-time stock information is now readily available permitting anybody with an interest to react based upon the most up to date information they have access to. The increased proliferation of this information and the more efficient manner in which individuals can react to it accelerates economic crises in modernity faster than before. This raises further questions regarding the increasing speed at which economic crises erupt today and the corresponding narrowing of the window of opportunity within which a decision-maker can react. Consequently, for the legislature to defer to the executive on the grounds that the executive has greater expertise than the legislature on economic issues is not grounded upon any real basis when discussing a market with strong information efficiency.
Weak information efficiency and economic crises
A scenario may arise where an impending crisis may be foreseen on the basis of commercially sensitive information not disclosed to the public. The government, being privy to such sensitive information after being briefed by individuals with inside information, seeks to act upon this to initiate an emergency response to temper or prevent an economic crisis. In other words, the market in this scenario is demonstrating weak information efficiency and the executive wishes to capitalise upon it. 93 In such instances the executive may be able to claim a certain degree of expertise over the legislature. An example of this may be seen from
Ireland's decision to guarantee the vast majority of liabilities in its banking system in as an example of how legislatures are placed in a difficult situation when the executive claims that it is privy to sensitive or non-public information regarding the economy. Even with such inside information, debate may still rage over the correct course of action to be taken and whether such information can be relied upon. Of course, the evidence pertaining to a national security emergency may also be contested; however, this argument should be directed towards enhanced legislative scrutiny in a national security emergency. As stated previously, the necessity of exceptional emergency measures is fundamental to justify departing from normalcy, i.e. that there is no real choice but to take such measures.
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In national security crises, a convergence in political opinion often results and exceptional encroachments on human rights and other safeguards or democratic procedures may be acquiesced to with minimal resistance from political opponents, at least at the outset of the emergency. 101 While there may be some differences as to the degree to which such rights ought to be sacrificed in order to preserve security or the best approach to tackle the crisis;
nevertheless, a certain modicum of restriction is generally agreed upon. In this instance, there is a general convergence in opinion on both the left and right that state security interests ought to be advanced at the expense of individual liberty. 102 This convergence of opinion is potentially symptomatic of a degree of objectivity of the 'necessity' of decision-making in a national security crisis; i.e. to use Agamben's terminology, that the ends to be achieved by the claim to necessity are agreed upon by both the left and the right. That stated, this consensus may also arise for more malevolent reasons such as the potential to gain electorally from a 'rally around the flag' effect that can be seen in national security crises. 103 It is because of this convergence of opinion amongst political actors that de Londras argues in favour of judicial defence of rights in a period of national security crisis, due to the legislature's reluctance to push back against the executive.
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A convergence of opinion on economic issues?
In contrast to national security emergencies, the political sphere is more divided on economic issues. Even during a so-called economic state of emergency, the left and right may have To say therefore that an economic crisis constrains choice to an extent that such an option was 'necessary', ought to be viewed with scepticism as a result of the polycentric nature of the disputes involved and the resultant lack of consensus that arises with regards to what ought to be done. Instead, the subjective nature of necessity is particularly heightened with regards to economic crises. Such necessity, to use Agamben's language, is 'relative to the aim that one wants to achieve' and therefore reflective of the ideology of the decision-maker.
This may be particularly divergent from others' to a degree not seen in national security 
Entrenching subjective perspectives into normalcy
The broad spectrum of opinions on economic policy means that at the very least, the most legitimate answer as to what should be done should be left to bodies with the democratic legitimacy to do so. 110 Indeed, the whole purpose of the structure of legislatures is that they facilitate debate on these contested issues. expertise. In particular, the EU has been subject to intense criticism regarding the democratic deficit at its heart. Follesdal and Hix argue that European integration has meant an increase in 113 Thus Waldron argues that the basic argument for the legitimacy of an enacted statute is that all the alternatives had the opportunity to put their case and failed to win majority support, thus presupposing the possibility of individuals involved in the debate changing their minds. Waldron (n 113) 27.
114 Moravcsik (n 43). Relatedly, with the help of technology, greater distances can now be traversed in a much shorter period of time. This has led therefore to the compression of space as much as to a compression of time. A 20 mile journey by foot or by horse seems much shorter when it can be taken by rail or by car. Conception of distance is therefore equally dependent upon the epoch and society we live in. 131 Compression theory in economic affairs presents a challenge to liberal democratic states. As time is needed for the wheels of the liberal-democratic state to churn, time deflation heightens the consequences of a delayed response and thus increases the perceived requirement for an expedient choice of action. The compression of space also has an added effect of increasing the impact zone of a disaster. While the immediate effects of a natural disaster such as an earthquake may still be felt by the same radius from the epicentre as they always have been, the political reverberations of such an earthquake are felt further away by virtue of the response it predicates. Knowledge and information of the earthquake can spread all around the globe and a response effort can be co-ordinated beyond local parameters.
Space compression can also exacerbate the perception and impact of a crisis beyond its initial 'ground zero'. The spread of disease as a result of international travel, for example, is a challenge the World Health Organisation faces as evidenced by the proliferation of the H1N1 influenza virus that spread throughout the globe. 132 Military and other violent crises are also exacerbated by time and space compression. The proliferation of long range weapons, for example, has increased the geographical parameters of areas affected by such weapons.
Relatedly, the speed at which such devastating weapons can be deployed is also a cause for concern. States can now launch military missions from thousands of miles away with the threat of the deployment of such weapons ever present. is to be restored will therefore not look like the status quo that existed before the crisis as this is represented as part of the problem that caused the economic state of emergency in the first instance. Instead, the Eurozone crisis, and indeed economic crises tend to usher in 'new normalcies' where the mistakes of the past cannot be repeated. Permanent changes as a result of an economic state of emergency are therefore replete.
CONCLUSION
In general, the emergency paradigm has becoming an increasingly contested concept in the literature, particularly due to the assumption the paradigm makes in the ability to separate 34 not reactive and defensive but instead seem to be transformative, viewing the status quo that existed prior to the crisis as part of the problem that needs to be tackled. The classic justification of emergency measures -that they are self-defeating and seek to restore normalcy -is thus very weak when applied to economic crises.
The strongest correlation between economic crises and the emergency paradigm occurs in the area of restricted time. With time and space compression amplified in the area of economic affairs of capitalist states, pressure is ratcheted up and the window of opportunity within which a decision-maker can act becomes narrower. Governments may therefore feel they must make a swift decision and so ought to have the capacity to do so. The idea that it is 'necessary' for them to take action must, however, be recognised as a subjective claim and the legislature should be loath to defer to the executive's assessment.
In light of this, do economic crises justify deferring to the government? Three factors militate against such deference: the 'weak necessity' argument, the lack of superior expertise of the executive in matters regarding economic regulation, and the inability to quarantine such a side-lining of the legislature to exceptional situations as it is instead symptomatic of the decline of parliaments in modernity. In contrast, one factor weighs in favour of such deference: the time and space compression experienced by the modern capitalist state that the ordinary trappings of law and decision-making in a liberal democratic society can potentially not cope with. Do arguments against deference trump those in favour of it, or vice versa? Of course, a lot will depend upon each individual crisis at hand as consensus on what course of action should be taken fluctuates. However, arguments regarding deference to the government in periods of economic emergency are considerably weaker than those in periods of national security crises or responding to natural disasters. Consequently, notwithstanding this perception of urgency, deference to the executive during an economic crisis should be treated with scepticism.
